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Abstract
In almost every country, the modern "social contract" is an implicit bargain by which employees
offer up their good citizenship and their earnest labor in exchange for a viable package of benefits
(or at least a viable social safety net) that in large part is employer-provided. This employee-
friendly social contract paradigm holds up almost everywhere in the world, rich and developing
economies alike. But it does not apply in the United States, which operates under a unique, mar-
ket-driven version of common law employment-at-will. Under U.S.-style employment-at-will, as
distinct from employment laws elsewhere (and subject to certain isolated exceptions), broadly-appli-
cable rules generally do not force employers to give their workers any cap on hours worked; any
holidays (paid or unpaid); any vacations (paid or unpaid); any paid sick leave or paid maternity
leave; any medical insurance; any employer profit sharing; any year-end bonuses; or any severance
pay or pre-termination notice.
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A disproportionately large percentage of the world's multinational employers are based in the
United States. These enterprises cannot legally operate outside of the United States under an
American-style market-driven social contract. This article examines how U.S.-based multina-
tional employers export their unique, employment-at-will-colored understanding of the social con-
tract when they venture out and employ workers in countries other than the United States. The
article argues that when American multinational employers branch out abroad, although they
cannot, and do not export a U.S. employment model, they tend to rely on four operating assump-
tions about their core obligations to their outside-U.S. employees, assumptions consistent with the
American-style employment-at-will-based social contract: privity, compliance, code of conduct and
benchmarking. The article examines how U.S. multinational employers export those four concepts,
and what this tells us about their adherence to the social contract outside the United States.
We can define the "social contract" as an implicit accord between a society or govern-
ment and its people. But that leaves employers as non-parties, even though, of course, in
any conception of the modem social contract employers play a vital role.' Precisely what
role employers play in modem social contract analysis is an outgrowth of the specific legal
obligations that a given society imposes on them. In this regard, the employment law
systems of the world pose a stark dichotomy: The employee-friendly "indefinite employ-
ment" regimes of virtually every country versus the radically different, market-driven
"employment-at-will" system essentially confined to the United States.
Because the employment-law paradigm in the United States differs so radically from the
employment law regimes everywhere else, U.S.-based employers tend to operate domesti-
cally under their own uniquely narrow conception of the social contract. With a signifi-
cant percentage of the world's major multinational employers headquartered in the
United States, this dichotomy raises an inevitable question: How do U.S.-based multina-
tional employers, in their worldwide employment operations, meet their broad obligations under the
employee-friendly conception of the "social contract" outside the United States?
This article tries to answer that question in two parts: Part I contrasts employers' robust
role in fulfilling social contract obligations around the world, versus their uniquely modest
role domestically within the United States. Part II explores how American multinational
employers adhere to the social contract in their operations outside the United States,
positing that U.S. multinational employers tend to carry their heavy overseas employment
burdens by exporting four core operating principles: privity, compliance, code of conduct
and benchmarking.
1. In JEAN-JACQUES RoUssFAu, TiiE SociAL. CONTRACT (1762), Rousseau in essence defines the social
contract as an implicit accord between a society and its people. See generallyJEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT, book I, chs. 4, 6-8 (1762), available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/
RouSoci.html. But Rousseau, writing in the pre-modern era, has almost nothing to say about employers,
other than his section on slavery. See id., at book I, ch. 4.
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I. The Employer Role in the "Social Contract" Around the World, Versus
in the United States
In many countries there is an express constitutional guarantee of a "right to work,"2
thereby pulling employers directly into the heart of modern social contract analysis. In-
deed, almost every government forces employers operating in country-whether they be
government entities, private businesses or non-profits-to give their workers generous
social protections and benefits. These social protections and benefits include paid holi-
days, paid vacation, paid sick leave, paid maternity leave, caps on hours worked, and sever-
ance pay (or pre-termination notice for unfair terminations). Many countries-rich and
developing ones alike-require their employers to offer paid profit sharing, paid year-end
bonuses, even employer-provided housing funds. In addition, almost every country offers
its citizens employer-finded (if government-provided) medical care and pcnsions. And
almost all countries impose rules conducive to forming trade unions and other employee
representative bodies. 3 Certain jurisdictions (particularly in parts of Asia and Latin
America and across continental Europe) foster a labor law and collective bargaining cul-
ture that embraces a concept of a "social partnership" by which employer trade associa-
tions within an industry and trade unions actively "partner" to decide wage rates and
employment terms/conditions across an entire industry "sector."
4
In short, the terms of the modern "social contract" in almost every country amount to
an implicit and overtly employee-friendly bargain by which employees offer up their good
citizenship and earnest labor in exchange for a viable package of benefits, protections, and
a social safety net that is, in large part, provided by employers. It is as if the governments
of most countries offer an employment-centered social contract to their citizens: You con-
sent to live and work peaceably in our nation and contribute to our society and our economy. In
return, we will see that your employer provides for you: paid holidays, paid vacations, paid sick
leave, paid maternity leave, caps on hours worked, and severance pay (or notice) in case you get
2. See, e.g., Bob Hepple, Work, Empowerment and Equality, Address to the International Labor Organi-
zation in Geneva (Nov. 7, 2000) (discussing right-to-work provisions in the constitutions of Belgium, Greece,
and South Africa). Other countries' constitutions also enshrine a right to work.
3. For examples of employment laws outside of the United States imposing social obligations like these on
employers see, e.g., the country-by-country summaries of individual country employment laws. See generally
LINTRNATIONAL LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWS (William L. Keller & TimothyJ. Darby eds., 3d ed. 2008);
ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., TIlE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARAI VE EMPLOYMENT
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS (2007); EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW (Janet Gaymer ed., 2d ed. 2006);
IN'I-ERNAIIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: A COUN-FRY-BY'-COuNsITRY LOOK AT LEGAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN RESOURCES IN MAJOR MARKETS AROUND TIlE GLOBE, ASPATORE BOOKS STAFF (2005).
4. "Sectoral" collective bargaining of this nature is a powerful force in Brazil, and in EU states including
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and others. In recent years the European Union has
actively promoted an agenda of elevating "sectoral" bargaining to the "European level" by empowering the
"social partners" (at European level this is chiefly the European Employers' Federation, formerly called
UNICE, and the European Trade Union Congress/Confederation) with a voice in EU-level employment
laws, most recently including revisions to the European Works Council directive. For discussions by this
author of this "social partnership" trend rising to "European level" in the 1990s. See Donald C. Dowling, Jr.,
From the Social Charter to the Social Action Program 1995-199 7: European Union Employment Law Conies Alive,
29 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 43, 67-68, 71-74 (1996); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., EC Employment Law After Maas-
tricht: "Continental Social Europe?", 27 INT'L LAW. 1, 17, 20-23 (1993); Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Worker Rights
in the Post-1992 European Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to U.S.-Based Multinational Employers, 11
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 564.
FALL 2009
1240 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
unfairly terminated. Also, we will ensure that you get free medical care and a pension. And we
will actively foster employee organization and collective bargaining, to give you a voice in your
workplace destiny. In addition, many countries, both rich and developing ones alike, take a
step beyond this and implicitly agree with their citizens: Further, we will make sure your
employer offers you profit sharing pay, a year-end bonus, and housing or a social-benefits find.5
Some countries go beyond even that and impose a "social partnership" model on employ-
ers.
6 As such, in most countries the modern social contract is a tacit accord between a
government and its people in which employers play a vital role, not as contracting parties,
but as delegatees of key duties that governments assign to employers.7
This model for the modern social contract holds up in almost every country, from rich
nations such as, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Ko-
rea, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates, to developing economies such as, China,
Cuba, Egypt, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru and
Thailand.8 But this paradigm does not exist in the United States. Unlike the constitu-
tions of many other countries,9 America's constitution does not guarantee a "right to
work," in fact, as originally written, the U.S. Constitution expressly enshrined slavery.1°
The legacy is that, even today, the United States follows a peculiarly market-driven and
uniquely "American" iteration of the common law'I employment-at-will rule' 2 that gener-
5. See sitpra note 3 for examples of laws like these.
6. See svpra note 4 and accompanying text.
7. It would probably be inaccurate to argue that employers themselves are parties to a sort of "social
contract" with their own employees. Employers (even under employment-at-will) are legally parties to bind-
ing employment contracts with their employees. (Under employment-at-will, employment contracts may be
oral and they may be terminable-at-will, but they are inarguably enforceable contracts to pay wages for time
worked.) As such, while there may be implicit, socially-imposed terms to employment contracts, we should
not speak of the employer/employee relationship as a relationship built on a social contract because employ-
nent is a relationship built on an express, if sometimes oral, contract (of employment).
8. See supra note 3 (citing summaries of these and other countries' local domestic employee protection
laws).
9. See Hepple, svipra note 2.
10. The U.S. Constitution alluded to slaves until a late-nineteenth century amendment abolished slavery in
the United States. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (distinguishing "free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years" from "all other Persons"); U.S. CONSF. amend. XIII, § 1 (abolishing slavery).
11. The American-style conception of common law employment-at-will (which is set out infra note 12) is
uniquely, even peculiarly, American. The terminable-at-will nature of U.S. common-law employment differs
fundameitally from the default employment relationship as understood in other common law countries, such
as in United Kingdom (birthplace of the common law), Australia, Canada, Ireland, Kenya, and South Africa.
Under those jurisdictions' concept of common law, employment is terminable not at-will, but only upon
reasonable noticeor after pay in lieu of notice. According to a prominent London employment solicitor:
The traditional English law approach has been that the parties to an employment contract are
more or less able to agree what they like subject, in quite a few instances, to adhering to certain
statutory miniminums in the case of employment within the United Kingdom. One of the excep-
tions is that, under common law, where a contract is silent as to notice, the contract is deemed to
be terminable on reasonable notice. It is quite surprising that the default position under English
common law and the [terminable-at-will] default position under the common law of numerous
U.S. states is so very different.
Email from Oliver Brettle, Partner, White & Case LLP, to Donald C. Dowling, White & Case LLP (Oct.
23, 2008) (on file with author). The position under Irish common law is very similar to the British position.
Although today employment dismissals in Ireland are regulated by the Unfair Dismissals Act 1967 and
the Redundancy Payments Act, in 2008 the Irish Supreme Court reaffirmed that in Ireland, statutory en-
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ally (subject to some isolated exceptions) leaves non-government employers legally free to
deny their workers: any holidays (paid or unpaid); 13 any vacations (paid or unpaid); 14 any
paid sick leave or paid maternity leave;' 5 any cap on hours worked; 16 and any severance
hancements aside, "the position at common law is that an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee for any
reason or no reason on giving reasonable notice. I would slightly qualify that by saying that it does depend on
the contract but in the absence of clear terms to the contrary which are unambiguous and unequivocal, that
clearly is the position." Sheehy v. Ryan, [2008] IESC 14 (Apr. 9, 2008) (It.) available at http://www.supreme
court.ie/Judgments.nsf/60f9f366f1 0958d 18025 72ba003d3 f45/47f99eeacee 180498025742 700564b31 ?Open
Document&Highlight=0,106%2F04 (emphasis added). In Canada, the position is effectively the same. See
DOUGLAS G. GILBERT, BRIAN W. BURKEI-T & MOIRA K. McCASKILL, CANADIAN LABOUR & EMPLOY-
MENTr LAW FOR THE U.S. PRACTrrIONER 136 (2000) ("At common law in Canada, an employee can be
dismissed summarily only for cause. All other terminations must be on 'reasonable' notice, unless there is an
express term of the contract to the contrary"). For a summary of some of the nineteenth century English
decisions on common law employueit, by this author, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., A Contract Tbeoyjor a
Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with Contract Beyond the Unlawfid Means Test, 40 U. MAmi L. RFV. 487,
493-501 (1986) (discussing, inter alia, Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1883)).
12. According to an American law school casebook on U.S. employment law, the U.S. employment-at-will
doctrine:
developed more than 100 years ago ... [Under it], either employer or employee could sever the
working relationship for any reason, or without reason [and without notice], as long as there was
no explicit undertaking to the contrary. Courts were only interested in contractual commitments,
and not in whether the conditions set out in the contract were fair in the eyes of a judge or the
product of equal bargaining power.
ROBERT RABIN FT AL., LABOR AND ENIPLOYMENT LAW: PROBLFMS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN TIFE LAW
OF WORK 11 (3d ed. 2002). Although this articulation of employment-at-will is phrased in the past tense, the
employment-at-will doctrine remains alive and well in the United States today: "Despite dire predictions of
the demise of at-will employment in the early years of the twenty-first century, it appears... that 'funeral
arrangements' may still be a bit premature." Peter J. Strelitz et al., Employment-at-Will: Has the Death Knell
Officially Sounded?, 17 LN-r'L HRJ. 3, 16, 21 (Summer 2008).
13. U.S. federal, state and local laws tend not to impose holiday leave, paid or unpaid, on non-government
employers, leaving most U.S. employers free to assign work on national holidays, without extra pay. See iifi-a
note 27. If there are any exceptions to this, they are isolated and local.
14. U.S. federal, state and local laws tend not to impose vacation leave, paid or unpaid, on non-government
employers, leaving most U.S. employers free to assign work year-round without offering employees any vaca-
tion leave, paid or unpaid. See infra note 27. If there are any exceptions to this, they are isolated and local.
15. The United States and its states generally (subject to some isolated exceptions discussed below) tend
not to mandate that employers give employees paid or unpaid sick leave, or maternity leave. The U.S. Family
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2008), does require certain unpaid leaves. But the
FMLA is not a sick leave law because it does not reach routine sickness but, rather, imposes unpaid leave on
only illnesses so grave that "the employee is unable to perform the fimctions of her position on account of a
serious health condition." De la Rama v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 541 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2008).
"Calling in sick without providing additional information" is not enough to trigger the FMLA because
"'[slick' does not imply 'a serious health condition.'" Id. That is, an American employee who merely "call[s]
in sick" does not trigger the U.S. FMLA because to trigger the EMLA, a sick employee must also "indicatel
that she suffer[s] from a condition that would require an extended period of leave." Id. On the lack of paid
sick leave under U.S. state laws, see infra text accompanying notes 35-37. There are, however, some isolated
exceptions of local sick-leave municipal ordinances, such as those in San Francisco and the District of Colom-
bia. See S.F., CAL., AD.NIN. CODF ch. 12W; D.C. CODE A>,\'. §§ 32-131.01-131.17. In addition to San
Francisco and the District of Columbia, other jurisdictions have recently introduced bills, which would pro-
vide paid sick leave for employees. In the fall of 2008, voters in Milwaukee, WAisconsin approved an ordinance
requiring employers to provide employees with paid sick days. But that ordinance was found to be invalidly
enacted and unconstitutional in June 2009. Metro. Milwaukee Assoc. of Commerce, Inc. v. City of Milwau-
kee, No. 08CV018220, slip op. at 1 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. June 12, 2009), available at http://www.mmac.org/Image
Library/Decision-andOrderofJudgeCooperdated_6-12-09_(A3336894).PDF. The Healthy Families
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pay or pre-termination notice. 17 Neither the United States as a federal government, nor
any of its individual states, offer American workers' s government-provided medical care
(other than certain charity cases at poverty level). 19 Similarly, neither requires any em-
ployer profit sharing, any year-end bonuses, or any employer-funded housing.20 While
the United States offers a government-provided, employer-co-funded pension scheme
Act, H.R. 2460, 111 th Cong. (2009), which has been introduced in the U.S. Congress, also has a provision
providing for sick leave for employees, but as of July 2009 it had not yet been brought to a vote.
16. U.S. federal, state and local laws tend not to impose flat caps on hours worked (such as caps on hours
worked in a day, a week, or a month) analogous to the caps imposed in much of the rest of the world. Where
American laws do impose maximum hours, they usually apply only to certain classes of workers, often workers
under age 16. But, N.M. SrAT. § 50-4-30 (2009) sets a cap of sixteen hours of employment per day in New
Mexico, with limited exceptions based on occupation, and stipulates that violators can be guilty of a misde-
meanor. In addition, there are break time laws in local U.S. jurisdictions, and rest-between-shift rules in
certain sectors, such as for airline crews.
17. A U.S. law, Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (W.A.R.N.), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2909
(2008), and some similar state laws (e.g. New York Labor Law Article 25-A) require actual notice in some
layoffs, but these laws do not impose any severance pay mandate (although a law applicable only in Montana
does). And these mass termination laws do not reach most U.S. firings. On the limited reach of the federal
W.A.R.N. law (to only a relatively small subset of U.S. terminations) see lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Companies,
Workers Tangle over Law to Curb Layoffi, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2009, at Al. As such, in the United States, most
employees who are laid off have no legal claim. According to Charles Siedlecki, a "Chicago employee-rights
attorney" who in the late 2008 was "bombarded with calls from people who have been laid off and want to
know whether they have a legal claim[,] [but] [mlore often than not, there isn't a claim." Baldas, Wave of
Layoffs a Legal Minefield, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 17, 2008, at 1, 17. As a result, says Siedlecki, American "[p]eople
are hurting all over the place." Id. Another U.S. employees' lawyer, Andrew Friedman of Los Angeles, in late
2008 was also "swamped with calls from laid-off [American] employees." Id. In some cases Friedman asserts,
but does not necessarily win, a discrimination claim, but "there also are cases in which he can't find anything
wrong, Friedman said. "The worst part for me is hearing the calls from people who have been at companies
for 30, 35 years who are being laid off, and there's nothing I can do to help them." Id.
18. In addressing "American workers," this article does not distinguish between U.S. citizens and inbound
legal immigrants/guest workers, because there is little or no difference for our purposes. Employment laws
tend to cover those legally working in a country regardless of citizenship, and robust U.S. laws prohibit
discrimination in the United States. By law, a U.S. employer of legal immigrants/guest workers generally
needs to grant them the same protections as U.S. citizen-employees. In fact, under the letter of the law in the
United States, even illegal aliens (undocumented inbound immigrants/guest workers) in theory enjoy the
same package of employment rights as citizens and legal immigrants?although under recent U.S. case law,
illegal aliens' leverage to assert those rights, and their ability to recover damages awards if they do successfully
assert those rights, sometimes can be significantly compromised. But not always. In many contexts, even
illegal aliens working stateside enjoy all the same employment-law rights as citizens, including the right to sue
in court. See, e.g., Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers Inc., No. 18365/01, slip op. at 10 (N.Y. App. Div.
Nov. 12, 2008) (stating that an illegal alien can sue employer in New York state because "[cllearly, an em-
ployer should not be rewarded for its failure to comply with federal immigration law by being relieved of
liability for its failure to provide a safe workplace" to an illegal alien).
19. As of mid-2009, no law applicable across the United States required employers to provide health insur-
ance for workers, although action on this topic was proposed under the Obama administration, and there may
have been isolated local rules imposing certain insurance mandates. Those employers in the United States
that voluntarily offer health insurance are subject to a law called COBRA, which imposes certain post-termi-
nation insurance maintenance requirements-but COBRA requirements tend not to reach current workers,
and COBRA tends not to impose substantive restrictions on those employers that never voluntarily offered
health insurance in the first place. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1161-1169 (2008).
20. Id. U.S. federal, state, and local laws tend not to require employers to pay annual bonuses analogous to
the mandatory profit sharing and "thirteenth month pay" imposed in many countries. There are, however,
doctrines under American law that require employers to make good on certain bonus commitments that they
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(social security), the replacement rate of final average pay under this scheme is low. Fur-
ther, while the United States has a law on the books that protects trade unions, its 7.6%
unionization rate is among the lowest anywhere.
2 1
To those outside the United States, its market-oriented employment-at-will regime in-
evitably sounds harsh.22 But many Americans embrace the doctrine as a superior social
policy. According to former U.S. Labor Secretary Elaine Chao:
[There are people who prefer that U.S.] government play a larger role in the work-
place permanently. Those people advocate that the United States should be more
like Europe, and adopt European-style entitlement programs and more rigid labor
laws. On the other side are those who value opportunity over predetermined outcomes. ...
[Some U.S. legislators want to] dictate [to employers] what leave policies they must
offer, who they can promote, which benefits their health insurance plan must offer,
what kinds of investments can be included in their pension plans, and how they can
even handle the most basic business operational decisions ... This kind of Europeani-
zation of the American workforce would have dire consequences for our country's ability to
compete abroad and would disrupt the traditional labor relationships here at home.
23
According to a report on Chao's speech:
Chao added that Europe's labor policies include state-mandated limits on the work
week, limits on working hours, and leave policies that are mandated and subsidized by
the government but paid for with high tax rates .... I]n Europe the government decides
what benefits should he provided, Chao said. She added that in Europe, the results have been
disappointing-there is slower growth, lower per capita income, higher unemployment, and
longer durations of employment.24
Because the United States affirmatively rejects what Secretary Chao calls the "Euro-
pean-style" approach (an approach that prevails not only in Europe but across the rest of
may have adopted voluntarily. U.S. laws tend not to require employers to pay for employee housing, as
contrasted with housing rules and funds in, for example, Mexico and China.
21. In 2008, 7.6% of the U.S. non-government workforce was represented by a union, and 8.4% was
covered by a collective bargaining relationship-among the world's lowest levels of union penetration. See
Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 3: Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and
Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
union2.tO3.htm.
22. E.g., supra note II (contrasting U.S. employment-at-will with the traditional English, Irish, and Cana-
dian approach); infra note 24. For a case study of German employers' "family"-oriented approach to employ-
ment?a "model that warms the hearts of Germans, often leery of bare-knuckled 'Anglo-Saxon' ways." See
Carter Dougherty, A Happy Family of8,000, butfor How Long?, NY TIMES, July 12, 2009, Business section, at
1, col. 2.
23. Business, Government, Labor Disagree on Government Role in Workplace Regulation, DAILY LAB. REP. (Bu-
reau of National Affairs) No. 192, at C-1 (Oct. 3, 2008) (reporting on keynote address by Elaine Chao,
Secretary of the United States Department of Labor, at U.S. Chamber of Commerce "Labor Policy at the
Crossroads" conference of October 2, 2008) (emphasis added).
24. Id. (emphasis added). Chao's reasoning here seems widely accepted among Americans. For example,
even a recent opinion article in a Florida newspaper that makes the case in favor of the European-style social
contract (as it exists in Spain) over the harsher American regime concedes parenthetically that the Spanish
social contract, if replicated in the United States, would "undoubtedly have the side effect of tamping down
worker productivity and wealth accumulation." Robyn E. Blummer, Old World of Spain Can Teach Us How to
Live, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008.
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the world, in developed and developing countries alike), 25 employers in the United States
need not provide most of the employee protections and government-mandated perquisites
widely required elsewhere. In theory, this leaves American employers uniquely free to tell
their job applicants and employees things like:
" We understand that you worked seventy-six hours already this week. But we need
you to come in on Sunday, too. If you can't make it, you're fired. 26
" We don't offer any vacation or holidays. We need you to work on Thanksgiving. If
you don't like it, then quit.2 7
* We don't offer health insurance. If you get sick, you'll have to pay 100% of the
doctor's bill yourself.28
* You're pregnant and your baby is due tomorrow? Congratulations! But understand
that the minute you walk out that door to deliver, we stop paying you until you show
up back to work.29
* Yes, we know that there is a hurricane coming, and also an avian flu pandemic out-
break. But we need you at work today. If you evacuate, you're fired. 30
25. See supra note 3.
26. See supra note 16 (on the lack of caps on hours in the United States generally).
27. As to vacation, U.S. law does not grant employees vacation, either paid or unpaid. In May 2009, U.S.
Representative Alan Grayson (D-Fla.) referenced a poll which found that "29 percent of American workers
got no paid vacation at all last year, and half received less than a week off." Press Release, Congressman Alan
Grayson, May 21, 2009, available at http://grayson.house.gov/2009/05/grayson-proposes-first-ever-paid-va-
cation-law.shtml. Grayson proposed a mandatory-vacation law in the United States, in part because, Grayson
said, "[a]t least 147 countries have a paid vacation law, including all developed countries.... Every European
worker gets at least four weeks of paid vacation by law, yet the Euro is rising while the dollar is falling," Id.;
Jesse Greenspan, Bill Would Mandate Paid Vacation for U.S. Workers, EmP. LAw 360 (May 26, 2009). As to
holidays and Thanksgiving: U.S. law does not grant non-government employees vacation, either paid or
unpaid. In 2008, thirty-three percent of U.S. employers required some employees to work on Thanksgiving
Day (one of the most important American holidays), and twenty-seven percent of U.S. employers refused to
designate both Thanksgiving Thursday and Friday as company holidays. Employers this Year Are Granting Less
Thanksgiving Leave, BNA Survey Finds, DAILY LAB. REp. (Bureau of National Affairs) No. 216, at C-I (Nov.
7, 2008)
28. As discussed supra note 19, the United States and its states do not mandate employer-provided health
insurance for current workers, although in 2009 legislation on this was proposed.
29. See supra note 15, on the Family and Medical Leave Act.
30. It is generally legal to fire a U.S. employee for evacuating during a hurricane, although in Texas an
employer cannot fire an employee for "leavfing] the employee's place of employment to participate in a
general public evacuation ordered under an emergency evacuation order." TEX. LAB. CODE ANrNT. § 22.002
(2007). The fact that Texas has this statute shows that, absent such a statute, firing an employee for evacuat-
ing is generally legal under U.S. employment at-will. Few, if any other U.S. states have statutes like this, and
even in Texas an employer remains free to fire (without penalty) an employee who evacuates absent an official
"emergency evacuation order." As to a disease pandemic: Nothing in U.S. federal law prohibits an employer
from firing an employee for absenteeism because of a pandemic. Such a fired employee might theoretically
be able to make out a claim for a health/safety law violationibut only if he could meet a burden to prove the
pandemic had somehow rendered the specific workplace so hazardous that the job site itself instills "an objec-
tively reasonable apprehension of death or serious injury." Jonathan A. Segal, Encouraging Absenteeism, HR
MAG., Oct. 2008, at 103, 106-08 (construing U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act regulation 29 CFR
§1977.12(b)(2)). The same standard would apply to a workplace threatened by a hurricane.
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" We are restructuring. Because of economic pressures, we need to cut back your
work hours, we need to discontinue some of our benefit programs, and we need to
tighten up our work rules. These changes take effect immediately.
31
* Our company is like a family. We prefer to deal directly with our employees. You
don't need a labor union to come between you and us. If you support a union, you
could have to pay union dues, and your take-home pay will go down. We urge you
not to support a union.
* Thank you for working here for the last thirty years. But your new boss doesn't like
your attitude, and your services are no longer needed. Our policy is not to offer any
notice or severance pay, so you will receive nothing other than a final paycheck for
work through today. Please clean out your desk and go home.
32
To observers outside of the United States, employer statements like these may sound
outrageous. indeed, even within the context of many Amcricans' professional experience,
these statements would seem harsh. But in discussing the "social contract" in the United
States, we are not concerned with employers of professionals. These harsh statements
(and statements like them) sound all too familiar to many American laborers toiling on the
lower rungs of the American economic ladder, outside highly compensated positions at
Fortune 500 companies far away from Wall Street. Huge numbers of smaller U.S. em-
ployers-be they retailers, restaurants, janitorial services, hospitals, printers, hotels, "temp
agencies," construction contractors, taxi services, farmers, auto mechanics, nail salons, or
any of thousands of other businesses-regularly do take harsh positions like these. Indeed,
even some Fortune 500 employers impose no caps on hours worked, offer no severance
pay, recognize no trade unions, and offer no medical insurance, at least as to their part-
time and temporary workers. And many major, well-regarded employers in the United
States do use their freedoms under employment-at-will selectively, such as, for example,
to tolerate long hours from non-exempt staff, or to offer only a minimal paid maternity
31. U.S. employers are free to do restructurings and to make sweeping reductions in work terms, a freedom
they exercise regularly. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, A Hidden Toll on Employment: Cut to Part Time, N.Y.
TwuES, July 31, 2008 (reporting on U.S. employers unilaterally cutting hours, benefits and take-home pay).
Another New York Times piece addresses the trend of U.S. workers "being told to move abroad-or else."
Louise Story, Leaving Wall Street for a Job Overseas, N.Y. TIs\tEs, August 11, 2008. According to that article,
U.S. employers will transfer a worker saying "I don't care if your wife has to stay here, this is what you have to
do." Id. U.S. employers also regularly rewrite employee handbooks, discontinue HR programs, and down-
grade employees' jobs and job titles. These unilateral reductions in U.S. work terms are possible because the
United States has no doctrine of vested and acquired rights. Americans usually think of employment-at-will
as related to employment terminations, because employment-at-will is defined as an employer's right to fire
an employee for any reason or no reason except a discriminatory or retaliatory reason-even on a "whim."
Strelitz et al., supra note 12, at 16. But employment-at-will also is what grants U.S. employers their freedom
to reduce employment terms in day-to-day human resources operations: After all, an employee who can be
fired at will has no standing to complain about a reduction in conditions less than a termination. By contrast,
outside the United States the operative rule of "indefinite" employment regulates, restricts or prohibits em-
ployment terminations and grants to fired employees a cause of action (of one sort or another) for unfair
dismissal. That is, an implicit corollary of any rule restricting no-cause terminations is that an employer
barred from firing without cause also cannot constructively discharge. After all, if an indefinite-employment-
system employer could constructively discharge, prohibitions against unfair dismissals would become mean-
ingless as an employer without legal cause could "fire" workers simply by demoting, cutting pay, and as-
signing intolerable tasks until employees quit. And any restriction on constructive discharges is the same as a
restriction on unilaterally reducing material terms and conditions of employment.
32. See supra note 17 (on severance pay and termination notice).
FALL 2009
1246 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
leave benefit, or to impose broad layoffs. As former Secretary Chao confirmed, the overt
policy of the United States has been to take a hands-off approach leaving American em-
ployers free to deny their workers most social benefits and protections.3 3 The inevitable
result is that:
Not surprisingly (indeed, inevitably), America's lack of minimum worker protection
laws leads to "sweatshops" on U.S. soil. This is why American sweatshops are "dis-
covered" all the time-particularly in urban immigrant communities in New York
and Los Angeles. The Washington Post says, "there are thought to be 2,000 or more
illegal sweatshops in New York City." Our point here, though, is that America's
wholesale lack of tough laws on rest periods, caps on overtime, and the like mean the
number of legal "sweatshops" in America is much higher.
Of course, most U.S. workplaces are not sweatshops. Many big U.S. companies offer
cushy, well-paid jobs boasting plenty of rest periods, vacations, time off, and the like.
Any American reading this article likely enjoys one of these comfortable jobs, or is
studying to qualify for one. But U.S. labor unions and anti-sweatshop activists do not
waste their time on rich workers with comfortable positions. Their concern is the
plight of the poorest workers with the worst jobs. And you can be sure that-right here
in America-there are thousands of small, under-the-radar employers exploiting
America's working poor by legally assigning mandatory overtime and by legally deny-
ing American workers rest periods, adequate time off, and the like.34
From time to time, Americans themselves question employers' modest role under our
"social contract." For example, according to the Los Angeles Times in August 2008:
A [California] state bill to guarantee paid days off for sick workers[35] died Thursday
amid opposition from business lobbyists and lawmaker concern that the benefit was
too costly.
The bill would have granted employees of small companies in California up to five
days of paid sick leave each year. Workers at larger firms could take up to nine days a
year.
An estimated 6 million California workers-about 40% of the state's workforce-do
not have the right to take a day of paid sick leave to recuperate from an illness or
injury, see a doctor or care for a family member.[36]
Small businesses and their lobbyists who fought the sick-leave measure said they were
relieved that it failed. They estimated that the bill would cost 370,000 jobs in Cali-
fornia and would burden employers with $4.6 billion in new costs over a five-year
period.
The bill "unfairly presumed that small-business owners are able to provide paid sick
leave and don't want to," said John Kabeteck, executive director of the National Fed-
33. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
34. Donald C. Dowling Jr., The Multinational's Manifesto on Sweatshops, Trade/Labor Linkage, and Codes of
Conduct, 8 TuLSA J. CoMPo. & INT'L L. 27, 31 (2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Dowling, Manifesto].
35. See svpra note 15.
36. Because California does not impose paid sick leave on private employers, presumably the other sixty
percent of the state workforce with sick leave enjoys gratuitously-provided, not legally-mandated, sick leave.
This would seem high. Marc Lifsher, Employers, Costs Kill Paid Sick Leave Bill, L.A. TLNIES, Aug. 8, 2008,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/08/business/fi-sick8.
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eration of Independent Businesses. "That couldn't be further from the truth. The
fact is that many want to but simply can't afford it."
The bill, SB 2716, got sidetracked for this legislative session when the Senate Appro-
priations committee stalled its progress because it was too expensive.
The defeat occurred despite having strong popular backing, said its author, Assem-
blywoman Fiona Ma (D-San Francisco). In a recent Field Research Corp. poll, nearly
three out of four California voters surveyed backed the idea.
One sticking point for the bill was the estimated cost of enforcement and the require-
ments that the state government would be required to pay substantial sums to some
state workers not currently eligible for sick pay .... If the proposal had become law,
California would have been thefirst state in the nation to provide universal paid sick leave.
But it would have eroded the state's ability to attract new employers, said state Cham-
ber of Commerce President Allan Zaremberg. Ma's proposal was high on the influ-
ential business lobby's annual list of "job killer" bills. 37
In short, the mandated employer-provided component of the United States' social con-
tract is uniquely modest. The market-focused employment-at-will doctrine leaves Ameri-
can employers free to deny their workers what elsewhere are considered basic-even, in
some cases, constitutionally protected-social protections. Hailing as they do from such
an employer-friendly regulatory regime, U.S. businesses emerge onto the world stage un-
prepared to employ people abroad. Any American employer venturing out and hiring a
workforce outside the United States faces a tough challenge, and needs tools to surmount
it.
H. U.S.-Based Multinational Employers' Adherence to the "Social
Contract" Outside the United States
Up to now, we have contrasted employers' significant legal mandates under the rigid,
employee-friendly "social contract" in countries worldwide versus the looser, market-ori-
ented approach confined to the United States. But our inquiry in this article is into how
U.S.-based multinational employers fulfill their legally mandated duties under the social
contract in their operations overseas, outside the United States, under local social contracts
that are markedly inconsistent with American-style employment-at-will.
The world's many multinational employers that are based in the United States38 will,
when venturing out and setting up new overseas employment operations, inevitably look
at their foreign human resources relationships through a U.S. lens. We have already con-
37. Id. (emphasis added). Another example of an American questioning the paltry U.S. social contract is
Robyn Blumner, supra note 24.
38. Other multinationals, such as those based in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, similarly export their
own assumptions about the terms of their local "social contracts" when they do business outside their home
countries. But speaking broadly, outside-U.S.-based multinationals operate under a mainstream social con-
tract both at home and in their operations abroad (other than in the United States). And so the relative
differences these multinationals encounter abroad are slighter. For a discussion (by this author) of the ap-
proach a multinational employer takes in overseeing its local employment-law compliance practices across its
overseas (outside headquarters) operations, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., The Practice of International Labor &
Employment Law: Escort Your Labor/Employment Clients into the Global Millennium, 17 LAB. LAW. 1, 6-14
(2001).
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sidered the basic problem here: American employment-at-will is inherently inconsistent
with other countries' laws, customs, and employee expectations.
Of course, national governments outside the United States welcome inbound invest-
ment from U.S. companies. But there is a persistent "Trojan horse" fear that U.S. inves-
tors might bring with them their harsh employment-at-will approach, fomenting social
disruption. In 2000, for example, the New York Times reported on a "fr.enzy of concern in
France that American pension fund investments in French companies might be promoting
layoffs of French workers to benefit American retirees." 39
Perhaps this fear is unfounded. American employers figure out, quickly enough, that an
enormous gulf separates their domestic, market-oriented employment rules from the
more benevolent workplace laws in the rest of the world. In my observation, U.S. mul-
tinational employers tend to bridge this gap by exporting four core operating assumptions
to their employment relationships-assumptions that act as tools for adapting to the very-
different overseas employment-law environment:
1. Privity: U.S. multinational employers operating abroad seem to think: "Our em-
ployment and human resources obligations run to our employees and independent con-
tractors, but do not extend to other stakeholders, such as the employees of unaffiliated
business from which we buy things."
2. Compliance: U.S. multinational employers operating abroad seem to think: "We
must comply with all the local employee-protection laws that the host state imposes on
us-but we need only meet the mandated minimums."
3. Code of conduct: U.S. multinational employers operating abroad seem to think: "We
need a global code that exports our core corporate social responsibility initiatives on em-
ployer/employee conduct, and our belief in complying with U.S. legal mandates of anti-
fraud, anti-bribery, anti-harassment, and anti-discrimination."
4. Benchmarking: U.S. multinational employers operating abroad seem to think: "To
attract and retain good talent, we need to pay competitive rates in the local market and
offer market benefits packages aligned with our global compensation philosophy."
With this hypothesis-that U.S.-based multinational employers bring to their foreign
workplaces these four tools to help them adapt to tougher employment law regimes
abroad-we examine each of these four principles in turn.
1. Privity: A key distinction as to an employer's duties under any "social contract" is
the difference between an employer's responsibilities to its own employees (and its inde-
pendent contractors) versus an organization's duties (if any) to other employed "stake-
holders," such as those who work for its business partners and suppliers. This distinction
is privity of employment contract. Under "social contract" analysis, society imposes signifi-
cant duties on employers. So multinational employers owe real obligations to their employ-
ees worldwide, including to the employees of their overseas subsidiaries and affiliates. In
turn, a multinational employer's suppliers owe these same duties to their respective
employees.
39. Suzanne Daley, Europe's Dim View Of U.S. Is Evolving Into Frank Hostility, N.Y. TLMES, Apr. 9, 2000,
§ 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/09/world/europe-s-dim-view-of-us-is-evolving-into-
frank-hostility.htmlpagewanted=all (quoted and discussed by this author at Donald C. Dowling, Jr., How to
Ensure Employment Problems Don't Torpedo Global Mergers and Acquisitions, 13 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 159, 176
(2001)).
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Suppliers of course are external, independent businesses with their own stockholders,
stakeholders, human resources practices, and compliance obligations. Probably every
multinational is a party to supply contracts with outside suppliers, but the multinational
employer generally has no contractual relationship (no privity of contract) with the suppli-
ers' employees. Indeed, if a multinational employer could be argued to owe to suppliers'
(external) employees the same duties it owes to its own (internal) employees, then the
chain of responsibility would get so long that it could become meaningless-after all, the
web of interrelationships in the world's supply chains links each major business to hun-
dreds or thousands of other businesses. As a result (and subject to one key exception we
will address later 4O), U.S.-based multinational employers generally see their outside-U.S.
employer obligations as extending no farther than to their own workforces.
This observation about privity may seem obvious, or perhaps a mundane and technical
point. But the relevance is hoth broad and practical. Perhaps surprisingly, much or even
most of the academic discourse about multinational employers' employment obligations
under the "social contract" looks at these employers' "stakeholders," and focuses on a
multinational employer's obligations to "its workers," presumptively including those who
provide services even while "technically" employed by a different employer, such as an
external supplier factory company.4 1 For example, according to a New York Times report
on labor law compliance in China, "[l]abor rights groups that specialize in sneaking into
Chinese factories and documenting their flaws say exporters' multinational clients"?that is,
their customers?"are also responsible for their suppliers' practices." 42 Our question here,
which the New York Times fails to ask, is: "Responsible how?"
This "privity" point is that U.S.-based multinational employers may see their employ-
ment-compliance "responsib[ilities]" much more narrowly than these "labor rights
groups" do. To illustrate this, imagine a hypothetical U.S. sneaker company with sales
offices in a dozen Western countries that is party to product sourcing contracts with inde-
pendent factories in two dozen other-developing-countries. If this sneaker company's
business hits a downturn and it has to lay off (make redundant) workers globally, it will of
course stop ordering as many sneakers as it used to order. Faced with the drop-off in
business, we would expect the sneaker company carefully to orchestrate an internal, global
reduction inforce, complying with the complex "collective redundancy" laws in all of the
dozen Western countries where it directly employs sales staff, and paying severance pay
owed. At the same time, the sneaker company would be expected simply to reduce orders
from its independent external supplier factories in the two dozen developing countries-
without any regard to those nations' lay-off or severance pay laws. If this reduction in
orders causes the independent external factories in those countries to have to retrench, we
40. As we will see in our discussion of supplier codes of conduct (infra accompanying notes 61-66), U.S.
multinationals that source product from developing countries in four industries-retail, apparel, toys, and
home-improvement-have been particularly proactive about imposing and policing (monitoring) codes of
conduct on their outside suppliers. But this is the "exception that proves the rule": Outside of those four
industries, U.S. multinationals tend to focus their employment law compliance efforts on their own employ-
ees (and independent contractors) with whom they have privity. Infra notes 61-66.
41. See, e.g., JAMES ATLESON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORK-
ERS' RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY chs. 4-5 (2008); see also Doe I, et. al. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No.
CV 05-7307 AG, 2007 WIL 5975664, at *5 (W.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007), aftd, 573 F.3d 677 (2009).
42. David Barboza, Despite Law, Job Conditions Worsen in China, N.Y. TLMES, June 22, 2009, at Bl, available
at htrp://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/business/global/23labor.html?pagewanted=l&-r= 1.
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would not expect the U.S. sneaker company to get involved in "downsizing" the develop-
ing-world workforces, because it has no privity of employment contract with those laid-off
workers. It is merely a customer of their employer. As a customer, the sneaker company
does not even know who the laid off manufacturing employees are, nor is it even necessa-
rily sure how its own fluctuations in orders might affect staffing levels at each supplier
factory.43
For example, there is a company in Dongguan, China that employs 70,000 factory
workers who make shoes for "Nike, Reebok, and other brands."44 That Dongguan manu-
facturing company is so enormous and well-organized that it has "its own movie theater,
hospital, and fire department."14 If Nike or Reebok were to reduce its orders to this
Chinese giant, even though Nike and Reebok impose supplier codes of conduct,46 neither
would be expected (or even able) to get involved in "downsizing" the Dongguan
workforce, because neither has privity of employment contract with the Dongguan em-
ployees. Indeed, neither Nike nor Reebok would even know if its drop in orders directly
caused Dongguan layoffs-after all, the huge local Chinese company services "other
brands," as well.
4 7
2. Compliance: Speaking broadly, U.S. businesses entering new countries tend to
launch their new employment operations committed to complying with the local host-
country rules of the road. U.S. businesses branching out abroad typically register as em-
ployer entities under local corporate laws and then try to comply with applicable em-
ployee-protection mandates, including local labor laws that require recognizing trade
union agreements. 48 As American multinational employers see it, local host country legis-
latures' job is to lay down minimum local employment standards. Their job, in turn (as
43. The sneaker company is merely a buyer of sneakers from the independent factories in the developing
countries, even though the sneakers are made to the purchaser's specifications. See infra note 47. As such-
arguably-the sneaker marketing company is merely a couple of links up the supply chain from the end
consumer who wears the sneakers. If the sneaker marketing company should be held responsible even as a
non-employer for labor practices of the developing-world supplier factories, then should not the end user
who wears the sneakers be held equally responsible? After all, the only difference, in this regard, between the
sneaker company and the end consumer is which link on the supply chain each represents: Both are merely
buyers of the sneakers. Neither employs the people who make the shoes. For fuller discussions of this point,
see infra note 65 and citations therein.
44. Patrick Radden Keefe, Holding Up the Sky, N.Y. TuInES, Nov. 7, 2008, at BR 47, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/l 11/09/books/review/Keefe-t.html (reviewing LESLIE T. CHANG, FACTORY GIRLS
(Spiegel & Grau 2008)).
45. Id.
46. See infra note 65; and see generally infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
47. Keefe, supra note 44; see infra note 65; see also Barboza, supra note 42 (the beginning of the Barboza
article criticizes a workplace fatality at the Yiuwah Stationery factory in Dongguan, China, identifying that
factory as "suppl[ying] cards, gift boxes and other paper goods to Disney,... Tesco and other companies"; the
end of the Barboza article discloses that "[i]n a statement, Disney said only about 5 to 15 percent of the goods
produced at Yiuwah were made for Disney...").
48. WIe are discussing here U.S.-based multinational employers launching significant operations in a new
country. Of course there are exceptions to this assertion that typically U.S. businesses "try to comply with
applicable employee-protection mandates," particularly where a U.S. employer drops just one or two employ-
ees into a new national market and seeks to take shortcuts. For a discussion of this exception, see Donald C.
Dowling, Jr., New Country Start-Up H.R. Toolkit: What You Need to Know When Launching Employment Opera-
tions in Some New Overseas Jurisdiction, in 2009 E,'4PLOYAIENT LAW UPDATE ch. 3 (Henry H. Perritt, Jr. ed.
2009).
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employers operating locally) is to comply with the local laws as written and on the
books?if only to avoid penalties and bad publicity.49
Like our observation about privity, this observation about compliance might seem ei-
ther obvious or insignificant. But merely to assert that U.S. multinational employers com-
mit to compliance with employment law mandates abroad contradicts an often-leveled
accusation that U.S. employers exploit workers abroad, particularly in the developing
world. Human rights activists (and others concerned with social equity) routinely accuse
these employers of taking advantage of allegedly weak legal enforcement and allegedly
paltry union protections in developing countries. It has been said that:
International competition has made it increasingly difficult for employers in developed
countries to provide social benefits such as health and pensions as they have done in
the past. This has led to companies moving low-skilled jobs to low wage, low union
density countries .... 50
According to a U.S.-authored academic article:
[G]lobal corporations and their local suppliers are depicted as agents of exploitation,
taking advantage of developing countries' low wages and weak social and environmen-
tal regulation to produce low-cost goods at the expense of local workers' welfare. Numer-
ous reports have described exploitative working conditions in global supply chain plants.
Workers are paid only a few dollars and [are] required to work excessive work hours,
often in poorly lit and unsafe conditions.5
Another U.S. author speaks of "well publicized attacks" accusing multinational employ-
ers of being "greedy, secretive, exploitative[,] and concerned only with making money for
their owners and managers." 52
Accusations like these may be widespread. But insofar as they apply to multinational
employers' treatment of their own employees in the developing world, they are either
49. That is, U.S.-based multinationals adopt this compliance-focused approach not necessarily to live up to
amorphous obligations under a local social contract, but, rather, out of a concern with heeding concrete legal
mandates so as to avoid penalties and censure imposed on violators. In those situations where it might be said
that an employer is acting legally but immorally (such as by seizing upon some exception to a local employ-
ment law), the employer-side response is that any complaint about immorality in this regard should be di-
rected to the local legislature. If a party that complies with a rule can nevertheless be accused of acting
immorally, then perhaps the question becomes: Why did the local legislature approve that rule? Joe Falcone,
who for "nearly a decade" inspected labor conditions at garment factories in Asia, usually seemed to find
factories in compliance (at least at the times of his inspections), even if he found conditions worse than
optimal. So, even though Asian labor protection laws tend to be much tougher than employee protection
laws in the United States. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text ; Samuel G. Freedman, A 'Fair Trade'
Approach to Licensed College Gear, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/nyregion/
13education.html. That is to say, where strict compliance with laws is not good enough, the human ights
focus (like Falcone's focus) should shift from compliance to underlying legislative mandate. Otherwise, why
impose laws?
50. Email from Amir Paz-Fuchs to Donald C. Dowling, Jr., White & Case LLP (Aug. 16, 2008) (on file
with author) (emphasis added).
51. Richard M. Locke, Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons From Nike, 61 LNEOUS. & LAB. REL.
REv%. 3, 3-4 (2007), quoted in ArLESON ET AL., supra note 41, at 509-10. For examples of these "numerous
reports" that "have described exploitative working conditions," see ATLESON FT AL., at chs. 4-5.
52. David Henderson, The Case Against 'Corporate Social Responsibility,' POLICY ( J. OF THE CENrTRE FOR
INDEP. SrU.), Winter 2001, at 29.
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hugely exaggerated or dead wrong. I have said elsewhere5 3 that notwithstanding these
inflammatory claims, most U.S.-based employers operating internationally seem genu-
inely committed to at least minimal compliance with local black-letter labor protection
and unionization laws as to their own employees-if only because multinational employers
have a keen interest in avoiding the penalties and censure imposed on law breakers.
To test my assertion, let us take Monterrey, Mexico. For well over a decade, Monterrey
has been a bustling, union-dense, industrial town teeming with American-owned factories
of name-brand U.S. businesses, such as automakers, parts suppliers, tool makers, and farm
equipment manufacturers. Drive through the environs of Monterrey and you will see the
names of U.S. businesses over the doors of hundreds of factories of all sizes. These facto-
ries tend to be multinational-owned, not outsourcers. When Mexican laborers stream out
of these U.S.-owned plants at quitting time, ask them about their American masters' com-
pliance records:
* Do U.S. multinationals in Monterrey really pay agilinaldo (the mandatory Christmas
bonus) and the mandated ten percent profit-sharing stake?
" Do U.S. multinationals really respect Mexico's forty-eight-hour capped week?
" Do U.S. multinationals really follow Mexico's rules mandating paid rest days, paid
holidays, premium-paid vacation, paid sick leave, and paid maternity leave?
" Do U.S. multinationals in Monterrey really recognize labor unions?
In most all cases, the answer you will get to these questions will be "yes?" or maybe a
qualified "yes" augmented with some grumbling at the margins about specific individual
pay disputes, or about dissatisfaction with a "services employer" structure that in effect
caps profit-sharing pay, or about complaints regarding "white unions" not fighting for
their members. But on the whole, Monterrey workers themselves will (whether grudg-
ingly or proudly) concede that American multinational employers boast a (generally) solid
compliance record adhering to the bulk of Mexican employment laws.
Given American-based multinational employers' mostly-compliant practices in Mexico,
the widespread accusation that U.S. multinational employers transfer abroad employment
operations to take advantage of lower "labor standards" and lower union-density4 seems
illogical: we have seen that outside the United States, even in the developing world, em-
ployee protection laws are much tougher than analogous U.S. laws, and union penetration
is much deeper.55 As we have also seen, any U.S.-based employer wanting to exploit weak
labor protections and low union density could do no better than to retain all its operations
stateside.
3. Code of conduct: Supplementing their focus on compliance, most U.S. multinational
employers try to export their core human resources principles to their overseas workforces
via an internal, global employee "code of conduct."56 Yet the principles underlying most
53. Dowling, Manifesto, supra note 34, at 40.
54. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text; infra note 65.
55. On tough labor protection laws outside the United States, see citations supra note 3. On comparatively
weak labor protection laws in the United States, see stipra discussion of employment-at-will, at notes 10-37
and accompanying text. On low U.S. union penetration, see supra note 21.
56. For a discussion by this author of corporate codes of conduct, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International
Code of Conduct Toolkit: Drafting and Launching a Multinational Employer's Global Code of Conduct, in CORPO-
RATE COMPLIANCE PRAGTICE GuIDE: THE NExr GENERATION OF COMPLIANCE ch. 4 (2009). On wide-
spread codes of conduct among U.S.-based multinationals, See, e.g., ATLFSON Er AL., supra note 41, at ch. 5.
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of these internal codes tend to fill only a fairly shallow pool of employee rights-many of
which U.S. law imposes extraterritorially anyway, or else already exist under host coun-
tries' domestic employment protection laws. Few U.S.-imposed global employee codes of
conduct grant to outside-U.S. employees of the multinational conglomerate significant,
otherwise-unavailable substantive rights. In fact, while global employee conduct codes
often extend some minimal protections to a multinational employer's own workers over-
seas consistent with the organizational commitment to "corporate social responsibility,"57
American multinational employers may seem to issue these internal codes more to help
meet their own externally-imposed obligations, such as under laws that extend extraterri-
torially outside the United States.
The typical U.S. multinational employer's internal employee code of conduct contains:
" anti-bribery provisions consistent with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 58
" anti fraud and whisticbower-houlne provisions consistent with U.S.Sarbanes-
Oxley
59
" anti-discrimination/harassment provisions consistent with the extraterritorial reach
of U.S. Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans
with Disabilities Act 6°
57. According to The Economist of London:
CSR [corporate social responsibilityl is booming. 'Whether through electronic screens, posters or
glossy reports, big companies want to tell the world about their good citizenship. They are push-
ing out the message on their websites and in advertising campaigns. Their chief executives queue
up to speak at conferences to explain their passion for the community or their new-found com-
mitment to making their company carbon-neutral. A survey carried out for this report by the
Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister company of The Economist, shows corporate responsibility
rising sharply in global executives' priorities....
Why the boom? For a number of reasons, companies are having to work harder to protect their
reputation-and, by extension, the environment in which they do business. Scandals at Enron,
WlorldCom and elsewhere undermined trust in big business and led to heavy-handed government
regulation. An ever-expanding army of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) stands ready to
do battle with multinational companies at the slightest sign of misbehaviour. Myriad rankings
and ratings put pressure on companies to report on their non-financial performance as well as on
their financial results. And, more than ever, companies are being watched. Embarrassing news
anywhere in the world-a child working on a piece of clothing with your company's brand on it,
say-can be captured on camera and published everywhere in an instant, thanks to the internet
"Doing well by doing good" has become a fashionable mantra. Businesses have eagerly adopted
the jargon of'"embedding" CSR in the core of their operations, making it "part of the corporate
DNA" so that it influences decisions across the company.
Daniel Franklin, Just Good Business, ECONOMiSTi, Jan. 17, 2008 (introductory article to issue-length special
report).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I to -4 (1998). For an explanation of why U.S.-based multinationals are generally
more vigilant in imposing robust anti-bribery human resources policies on their global workforces than are
multinationals from other countries-even other countries that have ratified the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions-see Neil Hodge,
Warning to Global Companies as FCPA Extends Its Reach, L'NT'L B. NEws, Aug. 2008, at 21.
59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2008). For a discussion of U.S.-based multinationals'
global human resources policies regarding Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., Sarbanes-
Oxley Whisrleblower Hotlines Across Europe: Directions Through the ,Maze, 42 LNT'L LAW. 1 (2008).
60. These U.S. discrimination laws reach outside the United States, but only to the limited extent that they
reach U.S. citizens working for U.S.-controlled employers. (The vast majority of U.S.-based multinationals'
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In addition to perhaps self-serving code of conduct provisions, these internal global
employee codes usually pepper in a number of other provisions influenced by American
human resources practices, such as clauses addressing the employer's right to monitor
employee computer use, bans on workplace smoking and alcohol/drug use, confidentiality
provisions, and restrictions on nepotism/co-worker dating.
In discussing internal global employee codes of conduct, we have to distinguish the
confined and separate phenomenon of external global supplier codes of conduct. We have
already said that U.S. multinational employers usually view their social obligations as ex-
tending only to their own employees (and independent contractors) with whom they have
contractual privity.61 But there is a key exception: a subset of American multinational
employers-mostly those in the retail, apparel, toys, and home-improvement industries
that source own-label product from the developing world-tends to impose on their de-
veloping-world suppliers external "sweatshop" codes of conduct meant to protect the sup-
pliers' employees from inhumane practices and employment law violations. After a series
of highly publicized scandals in the 1990s involving brands such as Nike, Wal-Mart, and
Kathy Lee Gifford,62 large American retail, apparel, toys, and home-improvement brands
started imposing external codes of conduct on their suppliers. Now a mini-industry has
sprung up around drafting, monitoring, and enforcing external supplier codes. 63
Surely, every major American multinational employer internationally outsources some
aspects of its operations-it has been said that outsourcing of back-office services fuels the
economic engine of India. But few multinational employers outside the retail, apparel,
toys, and home-improvement sectors impose robust external codes of conduct on their
outside suppliers.64 External supplier codes of conduct do raise fascinating issues relevant
to American multinational employers' adherence to the social contract. 65 For our pur-
outside-U.S. workforces tend not to be U.S. citizens, and as such are not covered by these laws.) Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, § 623(h) (2008); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17, §§ 2000e-l(a)-2000e-l(c)(2) (2007); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, §§ 12111(4)-12112(c)(2)(B) (2007). For a discussion of the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. employment discrimination laws, see Donald C. Dowling, Jr., International Labor-and-Employment Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER's DrSKBOOK 383, 398-400 (Lucinda A. Low et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
61. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
62. On these scandals and others see, e.g., AiLESON FT AL., supra note 41, at ch. 5.
63. See, e.g., id.; Dowling, Manifesto, supra note 34, at 58-59 (excerpted in ATLESON ET AL., supra note 41,
at 565); Blanpain et al., supra note 3, at ch. 14; Michael A. Levine & William J. Milani, The Role of Unions in
International Businesses' Codes of Conduct: Is There Strength in Numbers?, EMp. & INDUS. REL. L. NEWSL.
(International Bar Association Legal Practice Division, London, UK), Apr. 2008, at 8. This is not to say
that all external "sweatshop" supplier codes of conduct that U.S. multinationals impose are within these four
sectors. General Electric, for example, runs a robust external "Supply Chain Expectations" initiative that
builds labor protections into external supply agreements, and includes a tough monitoring component. Sarah
Gorman, General Electric, Presentation at the International Bar Association Annual Meeting, Buenos Aires,
Session on "The Legal Advantages and Risks of Global Outsourcing and Contracting Out" (Oct. 14, 2008).
For our purposes, the point is that General Electric's program is cutting-edge and exceptional-not typical-
among U.S. multinationals, particularly in services sectors. For a skeptical view of the U.S. supplier code of
conduct phenomenon, see JAROL B. MANHIEIM, CORPORATE CONDUCT UNBECOMING: Coors OF CON-
DUCr AND AN-rI-CORPORAITE STRATEGY (2000).
64. There are exceptions. See spra note 63.
65. In our discussion of privity, we distinguished U.S.-based employers' internal direct employment opera-
tions outside the United States, where the U.S. enterprise affiliate directly employs people, from the external
supplier scenario, where the U.S. entity and its affiliates have no privity of employment contract with the
local workers. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. In our discussion of compliance, we said that
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poses, though, this phenomenon is distinctly peripheral; the "exception that proves the
rule."66
4. Benchmarking: One area where U.S. multinational employers seem keenly attuned
to the social welfare of their worldwide workforces is the benchmarking of compensation
and benefits. U.S. employers-be they for-profit or non-profit-that venture out and
employ people abroad tend to focus sharply on the relevant local markets for "rewarding"
employees. As U.S. multinational employers increasingly propagate global compensation
philosophies, a mini-industry of compensation and benefits consultants supplies
"benchmarking" data to employers that design cutting-edge pay and equity-based com-
pensation packages around the world.
Almost every country imposes minimum wage laws. 67 But when U.S.-based multina-
tional employers set up their own (internal) employment operations in new foreign mar-
kets, compliance with these local minimum wage standards rarely registers as even a
compliance issue, because in matters of paying the employees on their own payrolls, U.S.
multinational employers generally (but not always) tend to aim well above the minimum.
American multinational employers simply cannot attract and retain good enough "talent"
by paying minimum wage. So, as former President Clinton has noted, multinational em-
(speaking broadly), where the U.S. entity or a subsidiary is the direct employer of overseas workers, compli-
ance with local employment laws tends, in general, to be strong. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying
text. The inference might be, therefore, that in the external supplier scenario, compliance is weaker. This
might be true, but in fact independent supplier businesses in developing countries that supply huge Western
businesses often (not always) boast better compliance records than Westerners may give them credit for. Just
ask Elie Wasser, who, when a junior at the University of Puget Sound, gave up his Spring break to monitor
factory conditions in the Las Mercedes free trade zone in Managua, Nicaragua. Wasser found that those
Nicaraguan factories, far from being exploitative oppressors, offered some of the higher-paying, better jobs in
town: "'Before I came here, I knew sweatshops were bad,' says Wasser. 'But now I realize that it would be
disastrous if the factories of the (free trade zone] and the jobs they provide were taken away.'" Katherine
Marsh, Spring Break in Managua, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 26, 2000, at 85, 90. According to Nicholas Kristof,
writing in the New York Times:
[While it shocks Americans to hear it, the central challenge in the poorest countries is not that
sweatshops exploit too many people, but that they don't exploit enough... [S]weatshops are only
a symptom of poverty, not a cause, and banning them closes off one route out of poverty. At a
time of tremendous economic distress and protectionist pressures, there's a special danger that
tighter labor standards will be used as an excuse to curb trade ... My views on sweatshops are
shaped by years of living in East Asia, watching as living standards soared?including those in my
wife's ancestral village in southern Chinabecause of sweatshop jobs . .. The best way to help
people in the poorest countries isn't to campaign against sweatshops but to promote manufactur-
ing there . . . Among people who work in the developing world, many strongly believe (but few
dare say very loudly) that one of the best hopes for the poorest countries would be to build their
manufacturing industries. But global campaigns against sweatshops make that less likely.
Nicholas D. Kristof, Where Sweatshops Are a Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A35. For a fuller analysis
of this point, see Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, Two Cheers for Sweatshops, N.Y. TL\iEs MAC., Sept.
24, 2000, §6, at 70; see generally Dowling, Manifesto, supra note 34, at 39-46, excerpted in RAIN, supra note
12, at 858.
66. In the words of anti-sweatshop advocate Joe Falcone, "[e]verybody is against sweatshops . . . The
question is: What are you for?" Freedman, supra note 49; see supra note 65.
67. For summaries of local-country minimum wage laws, see sources cited supra note 3. Germany and Hong
Kong have (at least until recently) been among the few exceptions: jurisdictions without minimum wage
statutes.
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ployers venturing into developing markets like China "generally" offer "higher pay, more
respect and a better working environment" than their local indigenous competitors.6 8
As such, U.S. multinational employers directly employing people overseas actively study
local markets and peer employer compensation models, often paying outside consultants
for benchmarking data, to design industry-competitive packages. Many U.S. multina-
tional employers aim to pay in one of the top two quartiles in the relevant market. Some
multinational employers propagate global compensation philosophies and offer equity-
based compensation to all, or at least to their executive-level, employees outside the
United States. And multinational employers increasingly align executive compensation
internationally (as opposed to yoking it to local markets). Obviously, the reason for these
benchmarking efforts is not social beneficence, but market forces: U.S. multinational em-
ployers benchmark pay and benefits abroad to attract and retain the level of talent they
need to succeed. For our purposes, however, the point is simply that they do this.
HI. Conclusion
If the modern "social contract" is an implicit accord between a government and its
people, 69 then employers stand off to the side as non-parties. But employers play an un-
disputedly vital role in this "quasi-contractual" analysis, if only as delegates of societal
duties. How do employers fulfill their vital role under the modern social contract? The
answer depends on the type of employment law system a host-country government im-
poses. A stark dichotomy separates the employee-friendly and paternalistic "indefinite
employment" regimes in most of the world, rich and developing countries alike, from the
vastly-different, market-driven employment-at-will system confined to the United
States.70
This contrast becomes sharpest when we look at how a U.S. multinational employer
approaches employment relationships in its own internal company operations outside the
United States, where employee-friendly "indefinite" employment systems trump Ameri-
can employers' default free market employment-at-will assumptions. U.S. employers op-
erating overseas seem to export their employment-at-will orientation only in the broadest
sense. In general, they tend actively to conform to host country conceptions of the social
contract. They manage to do so by exporting four operating principles: privity, compli-
ance, code of conduct, and benchmarking. For the most part, these four tools seem to let
U.S. multinational employers maintain their business-focused orientation forged under
employment-at-will while meeting the obligations of each host country's "social contract."
68. In a speech delivered on March 9, 2000 to the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
of the Johns Hopkins University, President Bill Clinton said: "Already, more and more of China's best and
brightest are . .. seeking jobs with foreign-owned-companies, where generally they get higher pay, more
respect and a better working environment." Clinton's Words on China: Trade is the Smart Thing, N.Y. TImps,
Mar. 9, 2000, at AI0; Dowling, Manifesto, supra note 34, at 41 (emphasis added).
69. See supra note 1.
70. Supra part I.
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